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How international is the European
legal order?
Retracing Tuori’s steps in the exploration of
European legal pluralism
Samantha Besson*
As Kaarlo Tuori has often emphasized, one of the most important challengesthe current legal reality in Europe raises for legal theory lies in the
integration of autonomous legal orders applying directly to the same people, hence
the impact of this European brand of legal pluralism on traditional legal theories.
Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere, what is needed in European legal theory is not
only a translation of national concepts into European ones to avoid the dangers of
rigid statism and of transposition of statist concepts onto post-national legal
realities, but also a radical re-interpretation of national legal concepts themselves
and hence a radical re-interpretation of national legal theory into an integrated
European legal theory.1
One should be wary, however, of focusing too much on European Union (EU)
law and its relationship to national law, thus bracketing out international law or
treating it at the most as background law and as the mere reflection of state will.2
International law has gradually turned into more than the sum of state wills. The
constitutionalization of international law discourse reflects the development of the
law of an international community that is often objective, general and sometimes
even imperative and has little to do with the traditional voluntarist picture of
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international law.3 As a result, both the objects and subjects of international law
have changed and now include individuals in areas previously covered exclusively
by national law. This makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish international
from national sources of law. The impact of international law on national law has
not only increased therefore, but also changed in nature (see Besson 2008a). This
has given rise to new discussions of old questions, such as the relationship between
national and international law and in particular questions pertaining to the validity,
rank and effect of international law in the national legal order.4
Interestingly, but also regrettably, however, these discussions have only rarely
taken into account the European dimension,5 and when they have, this has rarely
been done in a theoretical way and it has avoided the topic of the relationship
between national, international and European legal orders. The reverse is also true,
however. In recent years, European studies have often been characterized by their
isolation from international legal scholarship, with the exception of the field of
EU’s external relations albeit with its specific perspective. Of course, European
lawyers have factored (general and special) international law within the sources of
EU law, albeit usually at a lower rank than EU primary law. Yet, international
lawyers, despite being aware of the emancipation of the European legal order as a
special and autonomous regime of international law,6 conceive of EU law as a legal
order to which general international law applies, in particular secondary rules of
international law-making.7 The three autonomous layers of the European legal
order lato sensu8 are hardly ever considered at the same time, however, by either
European or international lawyers. This question cannot simply be reduced to a
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byzantine quarrel, as the degree of autonomy of the European legal order and both
the validity and the primacy of international law in integrated national legal orders
in Europe depend on the answer to it.
This blind spot in both European and international scholarship needs to be
identified and elucidated, as legal theory can only provide us with useful
explanations and insights of the concept of law in Europe if it accounts for all the
valid sources of law applicable at the same time in European legal orders, and for
the relationships between them (see, for example, Besson 2008b). The recent Kadi
saga9 certainly is a testimony of the complementarity between legal orders. In
addition, it tells us a lot about the EU’s perception of its own legal order and of its
relationship to international law, but also ultimately of its relationship to national
law and of national law’s relationship to international law. Finally, when one adds
conflicts of jurisdiction to conflicts of legal norms,10 as has been the case with the
recent Bosphorus11 (European Court of Human Rights [ECHR]/European Court of
Justice [ECJ]) and Mox12 (ECJ/International arbitral tribunals) cases, a clear
understanding of the contours of European legal pluralism and of the solutions to
normative conflicts becomes even more necessary.13
Accordingly, if European legal theory cannot be explained without focusing on
national law as well and revisiting national legal theory, the same should be said
about the increasing role of international law in national law and hence also in
European law, and about the relationship between these three (or more) legal
orders. Of course, the scope of this essay precludes doing all the necessary work for
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this new research agenda. Instead, I will react to Kaarlo Tuori’s introductory paper14
and the research plan of the Centre of Excellence in Foundations of European Law
and Polity,15 hoping to factor in the international dimension. In the following, I will
retrace Kaarlo Tuori’s steps in his introductory paper and focus on three issues:
first, I will try to clarify the notion of legal pluralism a little further; second, based on
the first issue, I will look in more detail into the European specific kind of legal
pluralism and venture a diagnosis of what is really at stake; and finally, I will discuss
ways of preventing, and providing remedies to the normative conflicts that inevitably
arise in circumstances of European legal pluralism and discuss the role of coherence
in particular.
1. The notion of legal pluralism
Before opposing pluralism to unity, the Centre of Excellence’s research agenda
opposes fragmentation to coherence and seems somehow to straddle both
oppositions. In this essay, I shall concentrate exclusively on pluralism and
coherence, but will first briefly explain why.16
Both fragmentation and coherence are polysemic concepts. Therefore the
research agenda rightly considers the possibility of facing both fragmentation and
coherence or either of them in the European legal order. Indeed, there seems to be
a difference of genre between fragmentation and coherence. While the former
describes a legal reality and in particular the lack of normative hierarchy within a
legal order or between two or more legal orders, the latter can be used to indicate
both a state or reality of non-fragmentation by virtue of the existence of a coherent
framework, and a normative requirement to react to fragmentation.17 In fact, it is
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arguably used more frequently as a normative requirement and remedy to the
former than to describe a legal reality. As a result, depending on one’s position,
there could be fragmentation or coherence, but also fragmentation and coherence or
fragmentation without coherence.
Although pluralism and unity are just as polysemic, they should not be paired
with the opposition between fragmentation and coherence. Coherence does not
mean unity and this is precisely why it is used in a context of a plurality of
coexisting legal orders. Moreover, unity refers to a legal state or reality rather than
also to a normative reaction to that reality. Therefore, coherence seems to be a more
open concept for our purposes. What about pluralism then? I favour pluralism over
fragmentation, as the latter conveys the idea of a whole that has been broken into
fragments or of fragments that could be put together again to create a whole.
Pluralism is more neutral in respect to the desirable state of the law and the
relationship between legal orders.18
Of course pluralism itself is an ambiguous concept. At least two dimensions of
meaning need to be distinguished. In the first dimension, pluralism can be used to
refer to the plurality or multiplicity of valid legal norms in one legal order or, in a
global context, to a multiplicity of legal orders. Usually, these plural norms coincide
in the same social sphere and overlap on the same issues, people and territory (see,
for example, Griffiths 1986, 8; Twining 2000, 8). Interestingly, the term pluralism
is used in international law to refer to the plurality of norms, sources or regimes
within international law (internal) as much as to the plurality of legal orders outside
international law (external). When pluralism means the plurality of legal orders, it
is usually used to distinguish itself from monism. As such, it constitutes an
elaborate and interlocking version of dualism. However, in this meaning of
pluralism, legal validity does not depend on the transposition of norms in each
other’s legal orders contrary to a dualist legal order. Pluralism in this meaning of the
term pertains to the validity of legal norms and claims that the law’s validity can have
many autonomous sources within the same territory or community.
The term can also be used, however, in another way, that is, referring to the
equivalence of legal norms or sources, either in the same legal order or between
different legal orders. In this sense, pluralism is opposed to hierarchy and pertains
to the rank of legal norms stemming from the same legal order or from different
legal orders overlapping in a given territory or community. Even within this
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category, the absence of pluralism and the rank between legal norms can have many
origins: the existence of a rank among the sources of law or that of a rank among
specific norms. Hierarchies of specific norms can be either formal (for example art.
103 of the UN Charter) or material and content-based (for example jus cogens). As
I have argued elsewhere, however, the constitutionalization of general international
law demonstrates a tendency towards a hierarchization of international legal sources
to match developing hierarchies of norms, in particular formal or material
hierarchies of norms. The same phenomenon has already taken place within the
EU legal order.
It is particularly important to identify the two pairs of meanings of the concept
of pluralism: first, pluralism qua validity or pluralism qua rank, and, secondly,
within either of them, pluralism of norms/sources or pluralism of orders.
All of these meanings do not need to constitute the same difficulty for legal
theory. It is one thing for lawyers and legal subjects in a legal order to recognize the
legal norms of another legal order as valid and hence as authoritative norms in one’s
legal order, and another to discuss which ones should take priority in case of
conflict. Neither do the remedies need to be the same in all cases. Thus, normative
coherence is a remedy to the absence of a hierarchy of norms or rules of conflict,
either between norms in the same legal order or between norms from different legal
orders. It is not so relevant, however, when the question pertains to the validity of
one legal order’s norms in another legal order. In these cases, however, pluralism
remains an important difficulty, as has been demonstrated by the debate about the
relationship between separate substantive regimes of international law. Of course,
in general, pluralism qua validity often only really matters when questions of
conflict between norms and hence issues of rank arise. And this is what makes the
distinction difficult to draw in practice.
2. European legal pluralism
2.1 First impressions and mutual perspectives
Legal pluralism in both its dimensions of meaning matters even more in an
integrated legal order like the European legal order than it does elsewhere. Indeed,
in the European legal order lato sensu, the national and the EU legal orders overlap
to such an extent in terms of their objects and subjects that they can be said to be
integrated. Integration amounts to another difficult concept, worth defining as it is
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allegedly what distinguishes the European legal order from an international one and
hence what explains Europe’s special brand of legal pluralism.
2.1.1 European integrated legal order   An integrated legal order, one could say, is a legal
order that mostly exists as such, i.e. as an autonomous legal order, when it is
imbricated into another one in terms of objects and subjects. The latter retains its
autonomous existence, however. Therefore, the European legal order consists, for
most part, of 27 distinct integrated legal orders. This is what Advocate General
Maduro means when he states in Kadi that the ECJ considered in Van Gend en Loos
that ‘the Treaty has created a municipal legal order of transnational dimensions, of
which it forms the “basic constitutional charter”’.19
Of course, integration in the European legal order lato sensu only goes in one
direction.20 National legal orders integrate European law rather than the other way
around. Interlegality, to borrow Kaarlo Tuori’s words, is therefore one-sided in the
European Union.21 The same may be claimed of international law, as certain
international legal norms could be said to be integrated in national legal orders in
the EU at least in areas previously resorting to national law only and pertaining to
individuals directly. In these areas of international law, the effects of international
legal norms within national legal orders are very similar to those of EU law. One
could, for instance, mention other special regimes in international law such as the
WTO, whose relationship to EU law and to the national laws of EU Member States
reveals the complexity of global legal integration. This creates, as a result, a multi-
centred integration of legal orders in Europe with a European legal order lato sensu
being itself integrated in each one of the 27 internationally integrated legal orders.
Bilateral pluralism, as one may call the plurality of national and EU legal orders,
could therefore with time give rise to multilateral pluralism in view of the
development of the international legal order qua integrated legal order.
Significantly for us, integration does not mean that the national legal orders
have become one within the European legal order lato sensu. Fifty years of
integration have shown that national legal orders have retained their constitutional
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autonomy.22 This is, of course, true of areas of national competence, but also of
areas of mixed or exclusive competence as national law still has an independent role
to play in the European legal order lato sensu and regularly affirms its autonomy. At
the same time, EU law has emancipated itself from both national and international
law as an autonomous legal order: it determines its own sources and despite the
absence (so far) of a formal Constitution, it functions as a constitutionalized legal
order. This is the case in areas where the European legal order is self-sufficient qua
EU law (including EC law) and/or regulates the acts of States and not of
individuals, for instance. Interestingly, therefore, the autonomy of EU law is
autonomy both from national law and from international law because it determines
the validity and rank of the norms applicable in its own order.
2.1.2 European integrated legal pluralism   Based on these considerations about the
integration of legal orders in the European Union, the specificities of the European
legal order and its special brand of legal pluralism could be captured as follows.
First, European legal pluralism makes it possible to grant immediate validity
(without transposition into the national legal order) to the norms of another legal
order without, however, imposing monism and diluting the national legal order
into the European one lato sensu or vice-versa. Of course, this approach differs from
the ECJ’s traditional conception of imposed monism,23 but also from that of the
dualist Member States whose creed has always been to condition the validity of EU
law in the national legal order upon a constitutional recognition of one kind or
another.24
If this is right, then, a lot could also be changed about the ways in which
national and international law are said to relate, at least in Europe. Indeed,
traditionally pacifist and international law-friendly States have been described as
monist because they grant immediate validity to international legal norms (without
incorporation into national legal norms). On the contrary, dualist States have often
been deemed as protectionist, which is surprising given that European integration
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ECR I 7357, par. 22 et seq.; Case C-181/73 Haegemann v Belgium [1974] ECR 449, par. 5.
itself does not go as far as to require monism. Neither view, however, adequately
captures the current relationship between national and international law in Europe
(see, for example, Paulus 2007; Kumm 2007).
One of the benefits of the Kadi saga has precisely been to clarify some of the
requirements of international and European integration in terms of validity,
regarding the relationship between international and European law, on the one
hand, and between national and international law through European law, on the
other. While the Court of First Instance’s (CFI) position in the case was clearly
monist both in terms of the relationship between national and international law and
regarding that between national and European law, Advocate General Maduro’s
opinion could be interpreted both in dualist and in pluralist terms.25 What matters
for us at this stage, however, is that it is clearly not monist, neither with respect to
the relationship between national and international law through European law nor
with respect to the relationship between European and international law.26 So, the
question arises whether this will somehow give rise to, or be interpreted as a change
of paradigm in the relationship between national and European law in enhancing
the autonomy of national legal orders. Or is it the exact reverse? Once the validity
of international law has been settled through EU law, the question arises whether
the national legal orders still have a word to say about the validity of international
law. Does legal pluralism between European and international law imply pluralism
throughout or does it impose monism in the relationship between national and
European law?
Second, in a similar vein, the pluralist nature of the European legal order lato
sensu means that the primacy claimed by EU law over national law, including
national constitutional law, does not create a single and definitive hierarchy of
norms within the European legal order lato sensu. Even if the origin of the norm of
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primacy is clearly European, at least according to the ECJ’s case-law,27 national legal
orders have always claimed to have kept the Kompetenz-Kompetenz.28
Interestingly, the Kadi case has reactivated this old question of the relationship
between national and international law through European law, on the one hand,
and between European and national law, on the other. The question is usually
answered by reference to Article 300 par. 6 and 7 of the Treaty establishing the
European Community and international law seems to be ranked below EU primary
law. Whereas the CFI saw jus cogens norms as the only limitation to the primacy of
Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter in the European legal order lato sensu,
Maduro’s opinion gives primacy to the European constitutional tradition including
fundamental rights in general, but only as long as no equivalent level of protection
of the same rights may be secured at the international level.29 As a result, thanks to
the autonomy of the European legal order, EU Member States could be given the
occasion to revisit traditional conceptions of primacy in their relationship to
international law and to reconceive that relationship in pluralistic terms. One may
also hope, in turn, that this pluralist reading of the relationship between
international and European legal order will apply to the relationship between
national and European law, which the ECJ does usually regard as monistic with
primacy given to EU law over national constitutional law. This change of paradigm
is something that might be feared in European circles where European legal
pluralism in the relationship between national and European law is not rated
favourably, and where the primacy of EU law vis-à-vis international legal norms,
and in particular WTO law, remains a sensitive issue.30
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2.2 Second thoughts and new directions
2.2.1 Perspectivism and the concept of law   European legal pluralism, even if it is an
attractive model of the relationship between autonomous albeit overlapping legal
orders, does still raise crucial challenges that need to be taken seriously. The most
important one has to do with the concept of law itself and the unicity implied by
the idea of legal validity. In short, can we still talk about ‘law’ in conditions of legal
pluralism (see Twining 2000, 41)?
A frequent reply to this objection is perspectivism. What matters, according to
perspectivism, is that within each legal order, participants have their own
perspective about the relationship between legal orders. And these internal
relationships are usually inspired by the monist or the dualist model. What matters,
however, is that the external perspective matches social practice and adopts a
corresponding pluralist model (see, for example, Günther 2001).
Of course, perspectives are inescapable and are an essential part of our legal
judgements, whether they are those of the legal practitioner or of the theorist.
Whether one opts for a pluralist model of the relationship between legal orders or
a monist one, equivalence or hierarchy are merely in the eye of the beholder (see,
for example, Richmond 1997). Thus, we know that both the ECJ and national
constitutional courts have claimed the ultimate sovereignty of their respective
constitutional orders in the past. Perspectives also matter in international law. Thus,
the relationship between European and international law is not perceived in the
same way by European lawyers and international lawyers (see, for example, d'Argent
2007 and Lavranos 2005).
Even from an internal point of view, however, perspectivism is far from being
a sufficient reply to the objection raised above.
To start with, the development of multilateral pluralism makes for complex
cases of mutually exclusive perspectives. Indeed, the ménage à trois between the
international, European and national legal orders implies that one could have cases
where the EU’s perspective as to the validity and primacy of international law
differs from that of national law. These discrepancies between internal perspectives
of the relationship between legal orders are bound to affect the viability of internal
perspectives. We are currently facing this difficult situation in the Kadi case, as
national and European perspectives relative to the validity and especially to the rank
of international law in the national legal orders might differ, thus questioning the
autonomy of national law and the possibility of maintaining an internal perspective
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without factoring in the perspectives of others pertaining to the very relationship
between legal orders.
Besides the complexity created when looking into the relationship between the
three legal orders, perspectivism does not provide us with a satisfactory answer
from a general legal perspective either. It flies in the face of the raison d’être of an
integrated legal order. It is indeed impractical at least in respect to the legal subjects
of the European legal order lato sensu who need to know which law applies to them
and which norm to obey in case of conflict. Things cannot simply be left to
jurisdictions to decide upon. The interesting question is indeed whether anything
can be done legally to legitimize the legal decisions which inevitably will give reason
to one or the other perspective depending on the case. Lawyers are ultimately
expected to decide and provide a legal answer to the subjects of the European legal
order. The European Court of Justice has often been granted the last word on
difficult issues pertaining to the validity and the rank of EU law in national law or,
as of last, of international law in the European legal order lato sensu. National courts
as well have often had to decide about the primacy of EU law over their own
constitutional norms. In all these cases, courts are surely guided by legal rules in
their decision; they are indeed applying norms from both orders and are therefore
relying on their validity and authority in their own legal order before they decide to
grant priority to either of them.
From an external point of view, moreover, perspectivism merely begs the
question. While it is unavoidable for those practicing law in a given legal order to
entertain an internal perspective (whether monist or dualist) (see, for example,
Günther 2001), it is not clear why the external perspective over the overlapping
legal orders as a whole should necessarily be one of pluralism due to the mere
existence of conflicts between internal perspectives about the relationship among
legal orders. Too often, European legal pluralism seems to be taken for granted far
too readily.
2.2.2 European legal pluralism and validity   In any case, how do we know integration
or, at least, the immediate validity and primacy of EU law in the national legal order
does not equate with monism and does not create a single hierarchical European
legal order or, on the contrary, does not amount to a sophisticated kind of dualism?
Why should our (largely contradictory) perspectives matter in assessing the validity
and primacy of different legal orders? After all, some of us could be wrong about
what the law really is.
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Of course, based on this last argument, some would argue that there can only
be one kind of legal validity per legal order, or else we would no longer be talking
about ‘law’. We are therefore back to where we started our exploration of the
concept of legal pluralism and back to the fundamental opposition between monism
and dualism. Monism is clearly not the right choice to capture the regime of validity
in the European legal order, however. An elaborate and dynamic version of dualism
could account much better for the current reality of mutual recognition among
legal orders and their flexible hierarchies.
However, when rules of recognition, to take the Hartian model, conflict in a
case of overlapping legal orders, should there necessarily be a meta-rule of re-
cognition which would bridge the legal orders and organize a common validity by
means of a single overarching legal order? Kelsenians, certainly, would deny that
legal validity can be split (see, for example, Somek 2007; Richmond 1997). The
Hartian model, I would like to argue by contrast, can be revised to accommodate
the post-national integration of legal orders and the coexistence of many rules of
recognition in overlapping circumstances.31
While it is true that per se neither the Kelsenian Grundnorm nor the Hartian Rule
of recognition can provide (socially32) plausible (nor even legitimate) accounts of the
relationship between national and EU legal orders, or of the relationship between
national and international legal orders, this does not mean that these models should
be entirely disparaged. Not only would one need to know which accounts could
replace them, which is not the case at the moment, but, furthermore, there are areas
of competence where national legal orders remain organized as they were before
European integration. The same can be said of areas of EU law that are not
integrated. Finally, in any case, the Hartian rule of recognition can also be applied
effectively to the international legal order, since, as I have argued elsewhere, the rule
of recognition does not imply a hierarchy of sources, besides its own highest rank
in the legal order, of course.33
That point made, one may wonder how legal validity could be granted to
norms stemming from different legal orders without necessarily having recourse to
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one legal order’s rule of recognition to vest the other legal order’s rules with
validity. Clearly, the only legitimate bridging norm would have to be legal, and not
only a social rule, in each legal order. But how could this be done without
threatening these legal orders’ respective autonomy?
A re-interpretation of Hart’s social concept of law allows for the development
of such a legal convention, without, however, creating a meta-rule of recognition in
a meta-legal order. That rule would have to be a shared rule co-generated, as a
coordinated practice, in both legal orders in full autonomy to solve the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz quandary. This is arguably the case of the rule of recognition of EU law
in national law or that of international law in national law or in the European legal
order lato sensu. This can only be the case, however, if this rule respects the
sovereignty of each of the 27 European peoples both qua national and qua European
people, by guaranteeing inclusive democratic processes at all levels of decisions (see,
for example, Besson 2006b and 2008b). And this in turn implies that, when
European authorities exercize their granted competences, they respect the
democratic principle of subsidiarity. This principle then constitutes the switch, as
we will see: the most inclusive forum of all those affected ought to be the one
deciding in each case.
The recent reinforcement in the Lisbon Treaty, not only of the representation
of States and EU citizens in EU law-making processes, but also of European
peoples through the involvement of national parliaments is a sign of the progressive
constitution of a demoi-cratic rule of recognition in the EU (see, for example,
Besson 2008b). Just like Russian dolls, this rule of recognition of EU law includes
albeit is not identical to the national rule of recognition. It is both external and
internal to the national rule of recognition, and this constitutes the essence of legal
pluralism. By reference to the notion of interlegality discussed before, the concept
of intervalidity could capture the way in which legal validity is granted in a legal
pluralist model.
At the international level, by contrast, the integration of legal orders has only
started to trigger the imbrication of democratic processes and hence of rules of
recognition (see, for example, Besson 2008b and 2008c). As a result, pluralism
usually comes closer to a form of dualism in practice, with national constitutional
norms vesting international norms with validity in the national legal order. This
seems to be confirmed by Maduro’s opinion in Kadi and his rather dualist approach
to the validity and rank of international law in the European legal order lato sensu.34
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as much as national legal norms is the priority of jus cogens norms. See Besson 2008a.
36 See e.g. on the risks of human rights imperialism, Cohen 2006; Besson 2008b.
Certain regimes of international law have developed towards the European model,
however, as exemplified by the WTO governance model.
2.2.3 European legal pluralism and rank   Of course, valid legal norms stemming from
different legal orders may conflict. The question then arises as to how to solve those
conflicts, hence the question of the rank of European law in the national legal order.
Conflicts of norms are common within legal orders and all sorts of formal and
material hierarchies of norms, but also hierarchies of sources may be developed as
rules of conflict. For reasons of legitimacy, the latter are usually used as process-
based shorthand for the former.
Conflicts of norms stemming from different orders may also be resolved
according to hierarchies of norms and to hierarchies of sources. Indeed, according
to the traditional monist or dualist conception, once they are vested with legal
validity in the national legal order, European legal norms are also vested with a rank
in the national hierarchy of norms and sources.35 Thus, they are usually ranked
below or at the same level as national constitutional norms, including human rights
norms. In a pluralist model, however, rank in the national legal order is not pre-
determined through the priority of one of the rules of recognition or the insertion
into national law. Primacy is usually recognized to EU law but on grounds of a
refragable presumption based on a multitude of criteria including human rights
protection, democratic inclusion, fairness etc. (see for example Maduro 2003;
Kumm 2004 and 2007).
These solutions, however, are focused mostly on adjudication. Moreover, they
lack the legitimacy one would expect of tie-break rules in circumstances of
reasonable disagreement about the right level of human rights protection,
democratic inclusion and fairness. Process-based criteria of the kind one finds
within each legal order, and in particular formal normative hierarchies or
hierarchies of sources, provide the highest degree of legitimacy and security one
may attain in circumstances of social and moral pluralism, especially outside the
boundaries of national legal orders.36 It would be contradictory indeed to privilege
a content-based test over a process-based test, when the material guarantees
protected by the content-based test actually protect those very processes by which
one could rank the different norms in conflict (see, for example, Besson 2005 and
NoFo 5 [April 2008]    65
37 See Bosphorus Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland [GC],
no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-IV. It is important to emphasize, however, that other decisions
taken in the wake of Bosphorus have not applied the test coherently, since they regard the
refragation of the presumption of equivalence merely as a question of admissibility: see e.g.
Coopérative des agriculteurs de Mayenne et la coopérative laitière Maine-Anjou v France (dec), no.
16931/04, ECHR 2006-XV.
38 See e.g. Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 v Ministero delle Comunicazione et Autorità per le
Garanzie nelle Comunicazione, Advocate General Maduro’s opinion, 12 September 2007, par.
20–22.
39 See the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions: Solange I BverfGE 37, 271
(1974); Solange II BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986); and Brunner BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993).
2008b). And even more so as process-based tests are used to apply content-based
tests in practice. Thus, respect for human rights is usually assessed according to
democratic rules, as the ultimate aim of human rights protection is precisely to
protect the democratic process.
Given the imbrication of the rules of recognition and their integrated
democratic pedigree, issues of rank can easily be resolved by reference to the
principle of subsidiarity. The most inclusive forum of all those affected by a
decision ought to be the one deciding in each case and hence the norms stemming
from that process ought to take priority (see, for example, Besson 2008a and 2008b).
Only then will the authority of their legal norms be able to preclude that of national
legal norms; indeed, primacy assumes (democratic) authority in the first place (see,
for example, Besson 2008b).
Of course, by analogy to what takes place in case of monism or dualism, given
the highest democratic pedigree of constitutional norms in the national legal order,
primacy should also be established by reference to equivalence in the degree of
protection of constitutional rights and principles. This is already largely the case
within the European Union, as confirmed by the European Court of Human
Rights in the Bosphorus decision,37 decisions by the European Court of Justice
pertaining to the equivalence of human rights protection,38 but also by national
supreme courts in France and Germany in the Solange I and II tradition.39 However,
it is important to emphasize that this can take place only by virtue of the democratic
credentials of constitutional rights in national traditions, and arguably also in the
EU.
At the international level, however, however, barring a few exceptions, the
integration of democratic processes has not taken place yet, thus placing a limit on
the comparative pedigree of norms stemming from separate legal orders in terms of
their level of democratic inclusion and respect for subsidiarity. If my considerations
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40 See Habermas 2007. One may argue that the advantage of Maduro’s position for
Member States lies more in the interposition of a power screen between them and the UN
Security Council than in the level of human rights protection guaranteed by an elaborate
constitutional dualism which most Member States in the EU apply anyway. The other
advantage of the pluralist model propounded by the opinion was alluded to before in this
paper and pertains to new insights into the relationship between national and European law
itself.
41 See on coherence in EU law, Besson 2004; Maduro 2003. See also Kumm 2004 and
2007.
42 See on coherence in general, Besson 2005, Ch. 11.
so far are correct, absent legal integration and hence legal pluralism, issues of rank
in a dualist legal order ought to be decided by reference to constitutional norms in
the national legal order and in particular by reference to fundamental constitutional
rights and principles. This might explain, for instance, why international law is
ranked below EU primary law in the hierarchy of sources in EU law. In Kadi,
however, neither the CFI nor the Advocate General have favoured that approach;
while the CFI has argued for the monist primacy of the UN Charter over national
and European constitutional norms, Maduro’s legal pluralism promotes the human
rights equivalence test discussed before. While that solution has the merit of
coherence with rules of conflict in the European legal order lato sensu, it might
amount to little more than wishful thinking in terms of what it implies about the
legitimacy of international law and by reference to the well-known risks of human
rights imperialism at the international level.40
3. European legal coherence
Of course, as in any national legal order, principles of prevention of conflicts apply
and prevention of conflict amounts to one of the normative requirements in the
law-making processes of integrated legal orders.41 In fact, legal pluralism is
nowadays as much about conflict as it is about relationship between legal orders.
Coherence is one of those normative requirements. It is a normative principle
that requires that the reasons given by legal norms be as normatively coherent
overall as possible.42 As such, it differs from logical consistency. It is one of the
constitutive elements of the authority of a legal norm in a given legal order.
Coherence applies as a normative requirement to all legal authorities, whether
legislative or judicial. It can be synchronic, but also, most importantly, diachronic.
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43 For an argument against autonomous adaptation of areas of Swiss law to EU law on
grounds of functional coherence, see Besson 2008d.
It applies within each legal order, but also between them in integrated legal orders
because those orders apply to the same people and hence have to provide those
people with a coherent set of reasons for action through their laws.
Of course, coherence should not be regarded as the panacea and it does not
dispense from the discussion of the issue of authority of law in general, which in
turn requires settling issues of validity and primacy. After all, coherence stems from
a deeper legitimacy concern: that of democracy. It is crucial therefore to unpack the
legitimacy concerns underlying the normative requirement of coherence and not to
stop at coherence. Coherence pertains to the content of valid legal norms in a legal
order, and does not tell us anything as to their validity or primacy. This explains the
difference, for instance, between functional and normative coherence: the
normative coherence of the applicable law as a whole does not mean that micro-
coherence in the substance of one legal branch is functionally justified.43
Coherence should not therefore be used as a fig leaf and processes of law-
making in the EU need to secure the required guarantees of democratic legitimacy
and inclusion of all affected interests. This is why it is not enough that coherence
with fundamental rights and other fundamental values guaranteed by national legal
orders, the European Convention on Human Rights and other international human
rights instruments, is required of EU law to be able to claim authority within
national legal orders. Democratic guarantees also need to be made relative to law-
making processes if coherent EU law is to claim validity and primacy in national
legal orders.
4. The future of European legal pluralism
A legitimate question at this stage of the argument might be the future of European
legal pluralism and its intertemporal dimension. If legal autonomy and interlegality
are closely related to democratic sovereignty, as I have argued, the answer to the
question lies in the future of democracy in a globalized world. As long as the
inclusion of those affected is done in a more effective way at the national level,
which given the need to implement EU and international law will be of all
likelihood the case for a long time, there are reasons for the resilience of national
democracies in Europe. The complex demoi-cratic setting of EU law-making
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guarantees the inclusion of both States and individuals at EU level in cases where
EU law affects individuals more directly and effectively. After all, the subjects of
these legal orders overlap, but are not identical given the importance of States as
political subjects in European and international law (see, for example, Besson
2008b).
Of course, each legal order per se is becoming more hierarchical by virtue of its
own democratization. I have argued that this could also be the case in general
international law and even horizontally across regimes of international law, at least
for norms of international law (see, for example, Besson 2008a). As I said before,
however, by reference to the compatibility of the Hartian model of a legal order
with a plurality of overlapping legal orders, internal hierarchies of norms and
sources are entirely compatible with external pluralism among legal orders. As a
matter of fact, the development of internal hierarchies might contribute to
simplifying questions of rank between norms stemming from different legal orders
by reference to their sources within each legal order. After all, indeed, the transitive
nature of the rules of recognition in terms of democratic pedigree should favour the
complementarity between internal hierarchies.
The key to European legal pluralism lies therefore in realizing the complexities
of European demoi-cracy. As of last, this also implies responding to the new
challenges raised by the increasing impact of international law on the European
legal order and, in the wake of that impact, by international law’s rampant
legitimacy crisis. Once more, Kaarlo Tuori’s seminal work on both democratic
constitutionalism and European legal theory has paved the way towards a better
understanding of the challenges to come. In this short paper, I hope to have
clarified a little further what these could be.
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